(Imam Ahmad Raza writes) As for Imām Muḥammad (d. 189 AH)’s statement that “I deem it as weighty as a mountain.”[1] let it not trouble you. For he has expressed a similar — in fact, even harsher — statement regarding bayʿ al-ʿīnah, while it too is classified merely as makrūh tanzīhī. In Radd al-Muḥtār, it is cited from Ṭaḥṭāwī, who quotes from al-ʿĀlamgīriyyah, which in turn cites Mukhtār al-Fatāwā, wherein it is reported from Imām Abū Yūsuf (d. 182 AH) that bayʿ al-ʿīnah is permissible and the one who engages in it will be rewarded.

However, Imām Muḥammad (d. 189 AH) said: “The evil of this transaction is, in my view, like the weight of mountains, because it was invented by ribā eaters”. And the Holy Prophet ﷺ said: “When you engage in bayʿ al-ʿīnah, hold on to the tails of oxen, become engrossed in farming, and abandon jihād, Allah Almighty will afflict you with such humiliation that you will never be freed from it until you return to your religion.” [2]

In Fatḥ al-Qadīr, it is stated that there is no karāhah in bayʿ al-ʿīnah, but it is considered khilāf al-awlā (less preferable), because it involves turning away from the virtuous act of lending with kindness.[3]

This position has been maintained similarly in Al-Baḥr al-Rā’iq, Nahr al-Fāʾiq, al-Durr al-Mukhtār, al-Sharunbulālīyyah, [4]  and others. Moreover, in Fatḥ al-Qadīr it is stated that Imām Abū Yūsuf (d. 182 AH) said: “This sale is not makrūh, because many of the noble Companions (raḍiy Allāhu ʿanhum) engaged in it, praised it, and did not declare it to be ribā.”[5]

In my view (Imam Ahmad Raza), the statement of Imām Abū Yūsuf (d. 182 AH) that “many of the Companions (raḍiy Allāhu taʿālā ʿanhum) engaged in bayʿ al-ʿīnah” falls under what is termed in the terminology of uṣūl al-fiqh as well as in uṣūl al-hadith as a ḥadīth mursal (transmitted ḥadīth with chain broken at companion). This is because, according to us, mursal refers to any ḥadīth whose chain of transmission is not uninterrupted. The distinctions between its types—such as mursal, munqaṭiʿ, maqṭūʿ, and muʿḍal—are technical classifications used by the muḥaddithīn (ḥadīth scholars) merely to clarify the specific nature and degree of disconnection in the chain. Whereas, according to us, all such forms carry the same ruling: if a trustworthy (thiqah) narrator reports a ḥadīth mursal, it is acceptable. We have elaborated on this position in our book Munīr al-ʿAyn fī Ḥukm Taqbīl al-Ibhāmayn, and it has also been explicitly stated in Musallam al-Thubūt[6] and similar works. And who could be a more trustworthy narrator than Imām Abū Yūsuf (d. 182 AH)?

Therefore, when it is established that most of the noble Companions (raḍiy Allāhu ʿanhum) practiced this sale and praised it, it cannot be disregarded—because the school of our Imām al-Aʿẓam (d. 150 AH) is based on following the Companions (raḍiy Allāhu ʿanhum). Indeed, the Messenger of Allah ﷺ has commanded us to follow them. As for the ḥadīth: “When you engage in transactions based on ʿīnah… etc.” —it has been narrated by Imām Aḥmad (d. 241 AH), Abū Dāwūd (d. 275 AH), al-Bazzar (d. 229 AH), Abū Ya‘la (d. 307 AH), al-Bayhaqī (d. 458 AH) from Nāfiʿ[7], who narrated it from ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUmar (raḍiy Allāhu taʿālā ʿanhumā).[8]

Imām Ibn Ḥajar (d. 852 AH) stated: Its chain of transmission (isnād) is weak. However, Imām Aḥmad has another chain for this ḥadīth, which is better than the first one.[9]

As for the isnād in the narration of Abū Dāwūd (d. 275 AH), it includes ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Khurāsānī Isḥāq bin Usayd Anṣārī. Ibn Abī Ḥātim (d. 327 AH) said: He is not well known, and Abū Ḥātim (d. 277 AH) said: He is not to be relied upon. Al-Dhahabī (d. 748 AH) stated: He is jāʾiz al-ḥadīth (i.e., his narrations are acceptable).[10]

Later, in the section on kunyas (patronymics), he mentioned him again and classified this ḥadīth among his munkar narrations.[11]And in Taqrīb, it is mentioned that there is weakness in them.[12] In summary, this ḥadīth does not fall below the level of ḥasan, and indeed Imām al-Suyūṭī (d. 911 AH) has referred to it as ḥasan in his al-Jāmiʿ al-Ṣaghīr. This ḥadīth has been reported through multiple chains, for which al-Bayhaqī (d. 458 AH) dedicated a section in his Sunan, and discussed their respective causes (ʿilal).[13]

In my view, the wording of Fatḥ al-Qadīr indicates that Imām Muḥammad (d. 189 AH) regarded this ḥadīth as authoritative (ḥujjah). In that case, the ḥadīth must indeed be authentic (ṣaḥīḥ), because when a mujtahid deduces a ruling from a ḥadīth, that very act of reasoning (istidlāl) implies his judgment of its authenticity. This principle has been mentioned by the Imām Muḥaqqiq ʿalā al-Iṭlāq (d. 861) in Fatḥ al-Qadīr, and by other jurists in various legal texts.[14]

In any case, this ḥadīth does not provide a conclusive prohibition against bayʿ al-ʿīnah. Do they not notice the continuation of the ḥadīth where it says:“When you begin to hold the tails of oxen.. .”[15] —meaning: “when you become absorbed in farming and agriculture”, as interpreted in Fatḥ al-Qadīr. There it is explained that this refers to abandoning jihād, resulting in a weakening of spirit and a disposition inclined toward cowardice.[16]

Indeed, this narration appears in Abū Dāwūd with the extended wording: “When you hold the tails of oxen, become engaged in farming, and abandon jihād…”[17] And it is well-known that farming is not prohibited. In fact, according to the majority of scholars, it is the most virtuous of all professions after jihād. Some have said: “After jihād, trade is most virtuous, then farming, then craftsmanship,” as mentioned in al-Wajīz al-Kardarī. Therefore, when ʿInāyah cited this ḥadīth as evidence for the condemnation of bayʿ al-ʿīnah, ʿAllāmah Saʿdī Afandī Chilbī (d. 945 AH) responded: “I say, if this reasoning were accepted, then farming itself would also become blameworthy.”[18]

In al-Hidāyah, Tabyīn al-Ḥaqāʾiq, al-Durr al-Mukhtār, and other works, the only reason mentioned for bayʿ al-ʿīnah being deemed makrūh is that it involves turning away from the virtuous act of giving a loan with kindness. Al-Hidāyah even adds that: “It is a turning away from good conduct by following the path of blameworthy miserliness.”[19]

And you are well aware that turning away from good conduct does not constitute a cause for karāhah taḥrīmiyyah. That is why it is stated in Fatḥ al-Qadīr that there is no harm in it, since part of the price corresponds to the prior promise, and giving loans is not always obligatory upon a person — rather, it is an act of virtue.[20] And in al-ʿInāyah it is mentioned that turning away from giving a loan is not makrūh — just as seeking profit in trade is also not makrūh, otherwise, all sales made for profit would be deemed makrūh.[21]

I say that tijārah (trade) itself is the very act of seeking the bounty (faḍl) of your Lord, and bargaining to reduce the price at the time of purchase is sunnah. Moreover, indeed the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said: “There is neither excellence nor reward in being deceived (ghabn) in buying.”[22]

This ḥadīth has been narrated by the authors of the Sunan from Sayyidunā Imām Ḥusayn (may Allah be pleased with him), by Imām Ṭabarānī (d. 360 AH) in his Muʿjam from Sayyidunā Imām Ḥasan (may Allah be pleased with him), and by al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī (d. 463 AH) from Sayyidunā Ḥaḍrat Sayyidunā Mawlā ʿAlī (d. 40 AH) — Karramallāhu Taʿālā Wajhahu al-Karīm. Therefore, the ruling on Bayʿ al-ʿīnah can, at most, reach the level of makrūh tanzīhī. If there is any degree of karāhat in it, it is only to this lesser degree, because sound and authenticated ḥadīths confirm that the noble Companions (may Allah be pleased with them) not only engaged in Bayʿ al-ʿīnah, but also praised it. And ʿAllāmah ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm (d. 1088 AH), a contemporary of ʿAllāmah al-Sharunbulālī (d. 1069 AH), wrote in his Ḥāshiyah al-Durar that the narration from Imām Abū Yūsuf (d. 182 AH) (may Allah have mercy on him) is as follows: “Bayʿ al-ʿīnah is permissible and a virtuous act, because it involves avoiding the unlawful. Creating a legal exit (ḥīlah) to avoid the unlawful is recommended (mandūb––mustaḥabb), and many of the noble Companions (may Allah be pleased with them all) practiced it and commended it.”[23]

[From here, Aʿlā Ḥaḍrat (may Allah have mercy on him) begins presenting arguments to establish that even if bayʿ al-ʿīnah is deemed makrūh (disliked), it can by no means be classified as makrūh taḥrīmī (prohibitively disliked). If someone insists on calling it makrūh, then to a large extent it can only be described as makrūh tanzīhī (mildly disliked). It should be kept in mind that all the following arguments are presented in the context of the earlier discussion on ḥīlah (legal stratagem), specifically those stratagems that take the form of bayʿ al-ʿīnah — in particular, the sixth ḥīlah–A.B.Siddique]

The tone and phrasing of his (ʿAllāmah ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm – d. 1088 AH) passage suggests that the statement, ‘Creating a legal exit to avoid the unlawful is recommended (mustaḥabb)’, is also from Imām Abū Yūsuf (d. 182 AH) himself. And Allah knows best. This constitutes the first fundamental evidence for the view that the discussed form of sale (Bayʿ al-ʿīnah) is not makrūh taḥrīmī.

Evidence two: The majority of the scholars have clearly stated that when either the unit of measure (qadr) or the kind (jins) is not the same between the two exchanged items, then any increase (ziyādah) is permissible. And it is evidently clear that a gold dīnār and a silver dirham, or a gold dīnār and copper coin (fūlūs), are not of the same kind (jins). Therefore, in such a case, the presence of excess or surplus (ziyādah) is unquestionably permissible. So then, from where can the ruling of karāhat taḥrīmiyyah be derived!

According to research, there are four forms of increase (ziyādah):

1. The commodity with greater value also has a greater quantity.
2. The quantity of the commodity is lesser, yet its value is still higher—perhaps several times more—like a gold dīnār compared to a silver rupee (rūbiyah).
3. The quantity is so small that its value becomes less than the item it’s exchanged with.
4. The quantity is reduced to the extent that both items become equal in value.

All the scholars have clearly stated that if the two exchanged items are of different kinds (ikhtilāf al-jins), then an increase or decrease in the exchange is permissible. And they have not restricted this permissibility to any specific scenario. Accordingly, this permissibility applies to all four forms mentioned above. If there were any karāhat taḥrīmiyyah in this matter, then out of these four cases, only the fourth (i.e., equal value despite quantity difference) would be considered permissible. Moreover, there exists another scenario:

• When two different kinds are equal both in quantity and value, even then the scholars have declared such an exchange to be permissible with increase or decrease. But that necessarily implies that the value would fluctuate.

(This may be considered as fifth form).

(If all these five scenarios are permissible and not makrūh taḥrīmī), then it necessarily follows that permissibility of bayʿ al-ʿīnah becomes established and necessary (wājib).

Evidence three: The Noble Prophet ﷺ said: “When the kinds (of commodities) are different, then sell as you wish.”[24] So who can dare to declare such a transaction sinful or karāhat taḥrīmiyyah, when the Messenger of Allah ﷺ himself has already granted explicit permission for it?

 

Evidence four: The passage we have cited above from Fatāwā Qāḍī Khān (in the sixth ḥīlah) states that if one gives a fals in exchange for a dirham, it is permissible and will ensure safety from ribā. (So, dear sir, our question is: when a jurist declares this to be a source of safety, then, Mawlānā Lakhnavī, please tell us—if this transaction were a sin due to being makrūh taḥrīmī, then what kind of safety could there be in committing a sin? Especially when a jurist of the calibre of Qāḍī Khān is calling it a source of safety.)

Evidence five: (In this argument, Aʿlā Ḥaḍrat uses an example to clarify whether a difference in value during the exchange of items renders the transaction permissible or not. Suppose, in the exchange of “a dīnār for a dirham”, or “a fals for a dīnār”, the weight is equal but the value (al-māliyyah) differs. If someone claims that such a difference in values makes the transaction makrūh taḥrīmī (prohibitively disliked), then it would necessarily follow that keeping the weight equal when exchanging pure (jayyid) and counterfeit (kāsidah) dirhams should also be makrūh taḥrīmī, because in that case a difference in value still exist. The reason is that people never agree to treat pure and debased dirhams as equal in value, often considering the price of a pure one to be double or more than that of a counterfeit one. Therefore, if the value difference renders the transaction between pure and counterfeit dirhams makrūh taḥrīmī despite weight equality, then by the same logic the exchange of “dīnār for dirham” should also be makrūh taḥrīmī, since there too a value difference exists. And if such a transaction is not considered makrūh, then the exchange of pure and counterfeit dirhams should likewise not be considered makrūh—because the Sacred Law has required only equality in weight between pure and counterfeit coins, regardless of their market value.)

The reason is that the very basis on which you have declared karāhat taḥrīmiyyah—namely, the “difference in value”—is also present here (in both examples). And in Sharīʿah, the Sharīʿah ruling (al-Ḥukm al-Sharʿī) of a matter cannot be separated from its underlying cause (illah). (In this case, the Sharīʿah ruling is “permissibility,” and its cause is “equality in weight.” Therefore, when the cause–equality in weight–in the transaction exists the al-Ḥukm al-Sharʿī of “permissibility of the transaction” will also apply.

Similarly, if a raw silver item—due to craftsmanship—becomes so valuable that its price is many times higher than an equal weight of similar raw silver or silver coins, then according to your principle, keeping the weight equal in its exchange should also be makrūh taḥrīmī. Yet the Sharīʿah only requires that such an exchange be based on equality in weight only. (If your principle were accepted, then it would imply that the Sharīʿah has commanded something sinful, whereas the Sharīʿah is pure from commanding sin). On the comtrary to makrūh tanzīhī, because that is in itself permissible (mubāḥ).

The difference between makrūh taḥrīmī and makrūh tanzīhī is that makrūh taḥrīmī is prohibited and sinful, whereas makrūh tanzīhī is permissible (mubāḥ) and carries absolutely no sin. In fact, at times, the noble Prophets (peace be upon them) would deliberately do something of this nature in order to demonstrate its permissibility.

As for the misstep of Mawlānā Lakhnawī (d. 1304 AH) in his treatise about smoking the ḥuqqah (water pipe), he mistakenly classified makrūh tanzīhī as a minor sin, and insisted that persisting in it constitutes a major sin—and this is a clearly evident error. I have explained this fault in detail in my separate treatise: “Jumal Mujalliyah anna al-Makrūha Tanzīhan Laysa bi-Maʿṣiyyah” (The Illuminating Sentences Clarifying that Makrūh Tanzīhī is Not a Sin).

 
Evidence Six. All the classical mutūn (sg. matan)–– legal texts––explicitly state that selling one fals (pl. fulūs) for two fulūs is permissible. As al-Baḥr al-Rāʾiq explains, the point is not confined to the specific case of one-for-two; rather, it establishes the permissibility of inequality between the two counter-values (al-ʿiwaḍayn) in such transactions. Indeed, even if one fals is sold for one hundred specified fulūs, it remains permissible (jāʾiz) according to Imām al-Aʿẓam Abū Ḥanīfa and Imām Abū Yūsuf. ^[25] What greater proof could there be for the permissibility of increase and decrease in value (al-māliyya)? Al-ḥamdu lillāh. Moreover, the scholars have explicitly stated that, at times, an act may be legally valid (jāʾiz) while also being makrūh tanzīhī within the same case.

Evidence seven: The aforementioned Bayʿ al-ʿĪnah transaction, which is fundamentally based on a disparity in value, isn’t limited to receiving twelve or thirteen silver rupees for ten rupees (as mentioned in Fatāwā Qāḍī Khān) or fifteen rupees (as in Fatḥ al-Qadīr). Rather, this form of sale can even involve receiving double or multiple times the original amount. For example, Fatḥ al-Qadīr [26] describes a scenario where Zayd, a wealthy man, is approached by Bakr for a loan:

1. Zayd sells his goods to Bakr on deferred payment for 2,000 rupees.
2. Then, Zayd sends an intermediary, ʿUmar, to Bakr. This intermediary, ʿUmar, buys the exact same goods from Bakr for 1,000 rupees in cash and takes possession of it.
3. ʿUmar then sells the same goods back to Zayd for 1,000 rupees.
4. ʿUmar then transfers his 1,000 rupees debt (owed to Bakr) to Zayd.
5. Consequently, Zayd pays this 1,000 rupees to Bakr (settling ʿUmar’s liability).
6. At maturity, Zayd collects Rs 2,000 from Bakr under the original deferred-sale agreement.

(This example is known as Al-Tawarruq al-Munazzam––Organised Tawarruq––in modern Islamic finance).

Thus, if a double profit is permissible, then multiple profits should also be permissible. In my view, the involvement of an intermediary isn’t essential. It’s also possible for the creditor to sell goods worth 1,000 rupees for 2,000 rupees on deferred payment, and the debtor then sells those goods in the market for 1,000 rupees, ensuring the goods don’t return to the original seller. (In modern finance, this is known as Al-Tawarruq ghayr al-Munazzam).

So if a twofold profit is permitted, manyfold profit is also permitted. In my view, the intermediary is not essential: the lender may sell goods worth 1,000 for 2,000 on deferment, and the borrower may then sell those goods in the open market for 1,000 so that the goods do not return to the lender. [This is what is now termed unorganized tawarruq]. However, Ibn al-Humām (author of Fatḥ al-Qadīr) deems it makrūh taḥrīmī when the very same ʿayn returns to its original owner, though there is room for discussion. The reason is that—by consensus—buying back one’s sold item for less than the selling price is permissible provided a third party intermediates, and the scholars did not regard that arrangement as sinful. As already noted from Qāḍī Khān (d. 593 AH), legal exits (ḥiyal) are meant to avoid the unlawful; if sin remained, the ḥīlah would not be complete. ʿAllāmah ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm (d. 1088 AH), in his marginalia on al-Durr, states under the heading of ḥiyal to avoid ḥarām that the apparent ruling is karāhat tanzīhiyyah, whether the item returns in whole, in part, or not at all to the original seller. [27]

Evidence eight: If a guardian (waṣī) wishes to buy the orphan’s property himself or sell his own property to the orphan, the scholars have stipulated that such a transaction is only permissible if it benefits the orphan. They have further specified that the profit for the orphan must be at least double in the case of immovable property and one and a half times in the case of movable property. This is mentioned in Fatāwā Qāḍī Khān and Fatāwā Al-Hindiyyah.[28]

Furthermore, if the guardian wishes to sell the orphan’s property to someone else, and the orphan does not immediately need the price of the item, and there is no such debt upon the deceased that would require selling the property for repayment—then in such a case, the scholars have ruled that the property must be sold for at least double its value for the sale to be valid. In Al-Hindiyyah, it is reported from Muḥīṭ al-Sarakhsī that this is the established legal opinion (fatwā).[29] Hence, this adjustment in valuation—requiring a doubled price—is itself a legal stipulation of the sacred Sharī‘ah.

Evidence nine: It is the statement transmitted from Fatḥ al-Qadīr and other reliable books that: “If a piece of paper is sold for one thousand rupees, then this sale is valid and not disliked (makrūh) at all.”[30]

Evidence Ten: In Radd al-Muḥtār, under the chapter of Ribā, ʿAllāmah Ibn ʿĀbidīn al-Shāmī (d. 1252 AH) — quoting al-Dhakhīrah — writes: [31] If a person wants to give a baker one thousand mann of wheat all at once, but receive the bread gradually over time, the best legal solution (ḥīlah) is as follows:

• Zayd sells one of his items — for example, a ring or a knife — to the baker in exchange for bread made from one thousand mann of wheat.
• Zayd hands over the ring or knife to the baker. In this way, the bread made from one thousand mann of wheat becomes a debt upon the baker.
• The baker then sells the same ring or knife back to Zayd in return for the one thousand mann of wheat that Zayd wishes to deliver all at once.
• Zayd immediately gives the entire one thousand mann of wheat to the baker.
• As a result, the baker becomes liable to deliver the predetermined quantity of bread to Zayd according to the initial agreement.

Now just think — on one side is a knife, and on the other, bread made from one thousand mann of wheat! If we begin to present similar examples, they would be too numerous to count. We have moved from the sixth to the tenth argument because the scholars have stated: “Wherever there is a shortfall in weight, another item should be added to compensate.” This ruling in their statement is absolute — whether the added item is the price (thaman) or the merchandise (mabi‘), and whether it is from the categories subject to ribā or not. In short, when both the item being sold and its price may have any amount of increase or decrease in value, it is permissible; this is the final conclusion of the investigation on this issue.